Trump’s push for Ukraine peace stalls as Nato deepens its long-term military and financial commitment to Kyiv.
IN what some media touted as a historic encounter, US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a face-to-face meeting in Rome on April 26, 2025, following the funeral of Pope Francis, in which both sides characterised the “unaided”, one-on-one discussion on the Ukraine war as productive.
During the meeting, the two leaders discussed key issues surrounding the war, including a potential ceasefire, strategies for achieving peace and competing proposals for ending the conflict.
The end to Europe’s bloodiest war since the Second World War appeared then to be in sight.
One year on, Trump, after repeatedly stating his optimism that a peace agreement is attainable and just around the corner, appears to have given up on his efforts.
Trump’s error appears to have fundamentally underestimated Nato’s role in the war and to overestimate America’s position as a global hegemon in being the key player in European geopolitics.
This approach contrasts sharply with Nato’s own strategic calculus, which points to a deep-seated investment in supporting Ukraine for the long-haul, not only to prolong the war but also to ensure a Ukrainian victory and prevent a Russian one.
Why Nato is invested in Ukraine war continuation?
Nato’s interest in the continuation of the war can be deduced from the following evidence:
0 Long-term strategy for Ukrainian victory: Nato is moving from “sporadic support for Kyiv towards a more industrialised, prolonged war strategy”. The goal is to ensure Russia does not win, reflecting a view that a Russian victory could embolden further aggression.
0 Massive, multi-year financial commitment: At the 2026 Ankara summit, Nato pledged €70 billion (RM327.42 billion) in military aid for Ukraine in 2026, with a commitment to sustain at least equivalent levels in 2027. This long-term planning signals a commitment to outlast Russia.
0 Shift to “Nato 3.0”: Nato is shifting towards a model where “European allies and Canada are now financing the majority of bilateral and multilateral security assistance”, aiming to reduce reliance on the US and build a sustainable European defence industrial base.
0 Deep integration of Ukraine: By allowing Ukraine to produce Patriot missile systems domestically, Nato is integrating Ukraine into its defence industrial complex, making support more self-sustaining and less susceptible to political shifts.
This investment is driven by the belief that supporting Ukraine is in Nato’s “direct interest” and that the war is not a temporary crisis but a “long-term project with multi-year budget planning”.
Nato’s Cold War origins
Just as important as understanding Nato’s perspective on the war – and why it will continue to oppose Trump’s efforts to end it – is burrowing into the origins of the organisation and its history.
This backdrop, missing from most media commentaries and analysis, helps explain why the supposedly defensive alliance is opposed to any peace settlement with President Vladimir Putin’s Russia, except on its own terms.
Nato was established in 1949 with three core goals: deterring Soviet expansionism, preventing the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe and encouraging European political integration.
To counter the Soviet Union, Article 5, a collective defence clause declaring that an attack against one member is an attack against all, has been in place.
This anti-Soviet positioning in European geopolitics was shaped through a series of specific historical developments and doctrines that go back 80 years. It has mutated beyond its initial objectives but is still a cardinal principle.
In 1946, US diplomat George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” argued that the Soviet Union was inherently expansionist but could be contained through firm, long-term strategic resistance.
This formed the ideological basis for Nato’s defensive perimeter.
The 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet blockade of West Berlin convinced Western European nations and the US that a unified military alliance was necessary to prevent the USSR from dominating the continent.
In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by 12 founding nations, establishing a security umbrella backed by the US. This effectively linked North American military power to Western European defence, deterring conventional Soviet superiority.
In response, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European ally states formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955, solidifying the Cold War division of Europe, which continued until the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Nato expansion and the Ukraine red line
Instead of dissolving after the Cold War, Nato has continued to expand its membership and mission.
Tensions escalated as Nato moved into former Soviet states and intervened in the Balkans.
Russia’s failed attempts to join Nato in the early 1990s suggested that the alliance was intended to exclude Russia.
The 2008 Bucharest Summit, where Nato declared Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members, is frequently cited as the point where the die was cast.
Another Russian allegation – not refuted by official channels – is that Western leaders gave informal assurances to Soviet President Gorbachev that Nato would not expand “one inch eastward” after German reunification.
From Moscow’s view, Nato’s subsequent enlargements (to 32 members by 2024) broke this promise and acted as a direct provocation.
Russians have seen this as an “existential threat” rather than an act of self-defence.
Putin has repeatedly asserted that Ukraine is a “red line”, a loss that would fundamentally shift the strategic balance of power and one that would be an obstacle rather than a positive step towards creating a new, inclusive European security order. It is a view that Trump and most non-European leaders appear to endorse.
Ukraine victory at whose cost
Whichever external forces and factors will be instrumental in helping to bring an end to the war, even the staunchest of Nato’s proponents cannot dispute the war as the tragic conclusion of a decades-long process where a triumphant Nato failed to build a pan-European security system, instead expanding to the point where Russia felt compelled to act.
Unfortunately, it is Ukraine that has, and will continue, to pay the price for the failure to end the war.
Lim Teck Ghee’s Another Take is aimed at demystifying social orthodoxy. Comments: [email protected]
