WHEN Japanese Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya noted in his welcoming speech at the trilateral summit meeting of Japan, China and South Korea on March 21 that the increasingly severe international situation may truly be a turning point in history, he was not simply expressing a personal opinion.
He was also emphasising a position on current geopolitical dynamics which is reverberating and gaining traction throughout the Western world and its allies as well as in the East Asia and Asia Pacific region.
This possible turning point has come about with the election of US President Donald Trump and his “make America great again” policy, which is not only upending decades-old alliances born out of the Cold War but is also reshaping the global political and economic order.
The likely consequences of Trump’s emerging yet already well-defined foreign policy and its implications for Asia and the Pacific can be discerned from his initiative and leading role in efforts to bring the Ukraine-Russia war to a settlement.
Trump’s foreign policy
The first aspect of foreign policy under Trump’s presidency is that US allies in Western Europe and the Asia-Pacific region will be expected to pay more for the military and defence protection provided by America.
For now, the White House is drawing up demands for Germany, Japan and other countries hosting US troops to cover the full cost of American soldiers stationed on their soil – plus 50% or more – for the privilege of hosting them.
In some cases, nations hosting American forces may be asked to pay five to six times more than they currently do, according to administration officials, under the “Cost Plus 50” formula.
Whatever figure is finally arrived at to ensure a “fair deal” to Trump’s satisfaction, it will not come cheap for Japan and South Korea, which have been tied to America’s militarised umbilical cord since the beginning of the Cold War 70 years ago. Japan has over 54,000 US military personnel stationed in the country whilst South Korea has over 28,500 active-duty soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines stationed there.
From 2016 through 2019, the US Department of Defence spent US$20.9 billion (RM88.19 billion) in Japan and US$13.4 billion in South Korea to pay military salaries, construct facilities and undertake maintenance.
The governments of Japan and South Korea provided US$12.6 billion and US$5.8 billion to support the US presence. In 2024 alone, the US military budget allocated to the Indo-Pacific command was US$15.3 billion.
Japanese policymakers – though not made public yet – are fully aware that in 2019, the Trump administration asked Tokyo to roughly quadruple the amount it contributed to the cost of maintaining US troops in Japan.
This demand for payment is likely to be made again soon – in one form or another – to the Japanese government for what Trump has repeatedly alleged to be past Japanese exploitations of American generosity in trade and defence and “predatory and protectionist” economic policies.
South Korea, although agreeing recently to increase its share of hosting US forces by 8.5% in 2025, can expect more pressure to pay a much higher sum for the privilege of American protection.
The second consequence is a possible Trump attempt to re-engage with North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un. Although unsuccessful during his first term in reaching any sort of agreement, Trump has said on several occasions after his inauguration in January that he will reach out to Kim again.
His reasoning: “I have a great relationship with Kim Jong-un, and we’ll see what happens. But certainly, he’s a nuclear power.”
If Trump is successful this time in his transactional and bilateral policy-making strategy, ostensibly aimed at bringing about the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula and reducing the possibility of armed conflict involving the US – as seen in his involvement in the Ukraine-Russia war – both South Korea and Japan will face heightened security uncertainty and unpredictability, whatever the outcome.
A third possible consequence could see a sharp reduction in US support for military partnerships – seen as wasteful, ineffective and unaffordable to a cost-cutting DOGE-dominated fiscal agenda aimed at reducing US annual government spending by US$2 trillion.
This Musk initiative, which calls for “temporary hardship” and for “everyone to take a haircut” to ensure long-term prosperity for the US, could lead to a reduction in the importance of security programmes in the Asia-Pacific region initiated during former president Joe Biden’s tenure.
In particular, the QUAD (US, Japan, India and Australia) as well as the Aukus (Australia, the UK and the US) trilateral security partnership may see diminished significance or even be abandoned altogether. This means that the US-dominated security systems of Japan and South Korea will not be favourable to the Conservatives and “new Cold War” advocates on both sides of the Pacific.
Trilateral convergence
Perhaps the most important development relating to this “turning point” is the consequences on the economic front for the East Asia region. Over the past half-century, the economies of Japan, China and South Korea have emerged as indispensable players in the global economy due to their economic size, industrial capabilities, innovation and the global demand for their products.
Trump, with the backing of America’s political and business leaders, wants to regain what the US has lost to its Asian competitors and to blaze a new page in the global economic marketplace. Most market observers expect China to bear the brunt of Trump’s tariff policies but South Korea and Japan will also be impacted, though less than China.
The trilateral meeting press release was reticent on the economic challenges that the three countries will face in the coming months.
However, the readout line stating that future exchanges and cooperation among the three countries will hold “great significance” indicates that they are more than likely to work together against protectionist policies and to collectively defend the open and free trade principles they currently uphold individually.
If that happens, it will help to defuse further their past conflicts and current geopolitical rivalry in the region. Their greater convergence on the economic front may also bring about an even more radical turning point than what Iwaya has drawn attention to.
Lim Teck Ghee’s Another Take is aimed at demystifying social orthodoxy.
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